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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REWRITING BROWN, RESURRECTING PLESSY

JAMES E. FLEMING*

INTRODUCTION
It is an honor and a pleasure to ponder Cooper v. Aaron1 and the legacy of
Brown v. Board of Education2 in general and to respond to David A. Strauss’s
wise and insightful Childress Lecture3 in particular. I want to address three
topics. The first two are encapsulated in my title: Rewriting Brown,
Resurrecting Plessy. I’ll examine the widespread phenomenon of “rewriting
Brown.” And I’ll document what I shall call “resurrecting Plessy”: the
phenomenon, evident in both liberal and conservative scholarship and
opinions, of charging one’s opponents with repeating the mistakes of Plessy v.
Ferguson.4 I’ll illustrate the liberal version by charging Justice Clarence
Thomas with resurrecting Plessy.5 Then I’ll demonstrate the conservative
version by showing how Thomas charges Justice Stephen Breyer with
resurrecting Plessy.6 My third topic will be Cooper in relation to Strauss’s
well-known theory of common law constitutional interpretation.7 I’ll argue
that such a theory needs a clearer distinction than he has provided between the
Constitution itself and what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitution
in order to be able to criticize Plessy as wrongly decided and to justify Brown
as rightly decided.

* The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law and Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law. I prepared this Article for the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture
& Conference, Cooper v. Aaron: Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, held at Saint Louis
University School of Law, October 5, 2007. I want to thank Professor Joel K. Goldstein and the
editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their warm hospitality on that occasion.
1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065
(2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Little Rock].
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 32–42, 50–62.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 48–49.
7. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law].
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I. WHAT BROWN SAID OR SHOULD HAVE SAID: REWRITING BROWN
As Strauss observes, Brown is an icon, a fixed point.8 No candidate for the
Supreme Court who expresses doubts about the lawfulness of Brown stands a
chance of being confirmed. No theory of constitutional interpretation that
cannot justify Brown is publicly acceptable. This iconic status of Brown has
generated an entire industry of scholarship: that of “rewriting Brown.” We all
know the general cast of this scholarship. The critic begins by saying: “I
believe Brown was rightly decided. But I am critical of Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s opinion in the case. Here is how I would have written the opinion.”
The critic then proceeds to justify Brown in terms of the theory of
constitutional interpretation, or the conception of the Equal Protection Clause,
she or he finds most cogent.
This type of scholarship is epitomized in Jack Balkin’s book, What Brown
v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts
Rewrite America’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision.9 When Balkin was
preparing this book, I said to him, “Jack, you should invite me to contribute to
your book on rewriting Brown.” I continued: “For my chapter, I would
contribute, word for word, the opinion of Chief Justice Earl Warren in Brown.”
I explained: “Despite all of the criticism of the opinion, it contains every
argument one needs to justify Brown.” Balkin declined to invite me, but he did
laugh and reply: “It’s been tried.”
Why would I have contributed, word for word, the opinion of Chief Justice
Warren in Brown instead of rewriting it? What arguments does it contain that
are sufficient? Here I would emphasize three points, echoing Strauss’s
analysis in many respects. One, Warren articulates a powerful conception of
the harm of segregation in terms of an anti-caste principle of equal protection:
“To separate [black school children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”10 Therefore, Warren concludes, “[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”11 That is the principle we need
to justify Brown. To be sure, Warren does articulate arguments that emphasize
the significance of education in preparing children for the responsibilities of
citizenship,12 arguments that do not apply to segregation in bathrooms,
drinking fountains, marriage, and the like. Nonetheless, his opinion rests upon

8. Strauss, Little Rock, supra note 3, at 1.
9. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2001).
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
11. Id. at 495.
12. Id. at 493.
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an abstract anti-caste principle that condemns segregation in all of these
contexts. Two, relatedly, Warren rejects Plessy’s doctrine of “separate but
equal” because he rejects Plessy’s view of the world, its view that the regime
of “separate but equal” did not harm blacks.13
Third, Warren’s conception of what violates the Constitution is a state of
affairs in the world, a practice that denies black school children the opportunity
of an equal education. It is not a state of mind in government, e.g., an intent of
particular governmental actors to discriminate or an attitude of raceconsciousness as such. Beginning with Milliken v. Bradley14 and Washington
v. Davis15 and continuing to the present, the Court has taken a different course.
The upshot is that we have been saddled with a “de facto” version of “separate
but equal” for our time.16 Warren’s opinion, by contrast, entails that
government has an affirmative obligation to secure a state of affairs in the
world that would afford equal education and equal citizenship for all.17
II. THE CONSERVATIVE REWRITING OF BROWN
Clarence Thomas has contributed to this industry of rewriting Brown, both
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court and recently in his concurrence
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.18
In a series of speeches in 1987, during the celebration of the bicentennial of the
framing of the Constitution, he criticized Warren’s opinion in Brown for
improperly making “sensitivity” or “the feeling of inferiority” rather than
“[j]ustice and conformity to the Constitution” the paramount issue in race
relations and constitutional interpretation.19 Thomas also suggested that the

13. Id. at 494–95; see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 89–90, 135–39, 156–58, 167–69 (2007).
14. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
15. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
16. Cf. Paul R. Dimond, Panel II: Concluding Remarks, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 63 (1992)
(“In its own way, Milliken can best be understood as a ‘separate but equal’ result for our times.”).
Dimond explains:
First, in considering the meaning of Milliken, it seems to me that the public message
of Milliken I and Milliken II, in combination, is that racial segregation in metropolitan
America is innocent once you get beyond the inner-city boundary: it’s no one’s fault and
no one’s responsibility. At the same time, the Burger Court bent over backwards to permit
an order against a state authority to infuse funds into an inner-city school district proven
guilty of de jure segregation.
Id.
17. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
18. 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
19. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 990 (1987).
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opinion fostered an attitude of dependence, victimhood, and entitlement.20 To
the contrary, I would argue, the Court’s statement about “feelings of inferiority
as to their status in the community” expresses an anti-caste principle, a
principle of justice that condemns racial classifications that undermine African
Americans’ status as equal citizens by reducing them to or maintaining them in
the status of an inferior or subordinate caste. In any event, Thomas argued that
Warren should have written an opinion invoking a conception of the colorblind Constitution.21
For some time now, debate about the interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause has been a clash between two competing understandings: an anti-caste
principle versus a principle of racial neutrality (or color-blind Constitution).
To state the clash simply, on the anti-caste interpretation, the Equal Protection
Clause condemns only racial classifications that reduce African Americans to
the status of an inferior race or caste (or maintain them in that status), whereas
on the racial neutrality interpretation, it condemns racial classifications as
such, whether unquestionably invidious or ostensibly benign. This debate has
played out most dramatically in the context of affirmative action, with the
defenders of affirmative action programs interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause as manifesting an anti-caste principle,22 and the critics of those
programs arguing that the Clause embodies a principle of racial neutrality or
color blindness.23 Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia have been the leading
champions of the latter view.24
Notably, for a time, the proponents of the color-blind Constitution put
Brown to one side (perhaps implicitly acknowledging that it speaks the
language of the anti-caste principle). They also put original understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause to one side (perhaps implicitly acknowledging, as
Justices Brennan and Marshall argued,25 that the Congress that proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment also afforded race-conscious relief to newly-freed
20. See id. at 991.
21. Id. at 992–95.
22. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243–45 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 387 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
23. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240–41
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
24. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J. concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at
520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
for the Court); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396–98 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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slaves and, therefore, the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was
not to ban programs like affirmative action). Instead, despite their professed
originalism, Thomas and Scalia argued for the color-blind Constitution as a
matter of abstract principle, justice, and wisdom, not original meaning. And
they appropriated Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy for their principle of color
blindness.26
But Harlan’s dissent warrants further analysis. To be sure, Harlan did
write: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.”27 This is the passage Thomas and Scalia love to quote. But
Harlan also wrote, in the same paragraph: “in view of the Constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here.”28
I would interpret Harlan’s dissent as a whole as expressing an anti-caste
principle. For one thing, I would read the forbidden “classes among citizens”
to refer to “castes among citizens,” not to “classifications among citizens.” For
another, Plessy itself pointedly rejects an anti-caste principle (and Harlan
famously criticizes it for doing so). The Plessy majority writes: “We consider
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority.”29 The Court continues: “If this be so, it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it.”30 That is, that’s their problem: they’ve got an
inferiority complex. Harlan famously retorts that everyone knows that “the
real meaning” of the law is to affix a “badge of servitude” or to put “the brand
of servitude and degradation” upon “colored citizens” as being “so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by
white citizens.”31 There is no more articulate expression of an anti-caste
principle anywhere. Harlan is not saying, pace Thomas and Scalia, that the
real flaw in the law is that it reflects race-consciousness as such.
Strikingly, Thomas’s concurrence in Adarand and dissent in Grutter reflect
the Plessy worldview. (You see, here is the part where I, a liberal, charge the
conservative Thomas with resurrecting Plessy.) One, Plessy had expressed the
view that: “Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts . . . , and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation.” It continued: “If one race be inferior to the other socially, the

26. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 551 (opinion of the Court).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 560, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”32
Similarly, Thomas writes in concurrence in Adarand: “Government cannot
make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before
the law.”33 Furthermore, Thomas clearly believes that governmental attempts
to “make us equal” through affirmative action programs have accentuated the
difficulties of race relations in America.34
Second, and relatedly, Plessy, like Lochner v. New York,35 bespoke a
strong anti-paternalism and a conception of natural social ordering (analogous
to Lochner’s conception of natural market ordering) that government should
not upset and in any event could not overcome.36 Similarly, Thomas’s
concurrence in Adarand expresses the view that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids “racial paternalism.”37 He further develops this view in dissent in
Grutter, invoking Frederick Douglass’s plea to “[d]o nothing with us!”
Douglass explains: “[I]f the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him
fall . . . . All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him
alone! . . . [Y]our interference is doing him positive injury.”38
Finally, at the same time that Thomas rejects the anti-caste principle in
favor of a principle of color blindness, he subverts the anti-caste principle to
condemn affirmative action programs. First of all, whereas Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in Adarand argues for strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs
because it is hard to tell the difference between “benign” classifications and
invidious ones,39 Thomas’s concurrence goes so far as to argue that ostensibly
“benign” classifications are invidious. He writes, “I believe that there is a
‘moral [and] constitutional equivalence’ between laws designed to subjugate a
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster
some current notion of equality.”40 Second, Thomas argues that affirmative
action programs, far from being benign, “stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority” and “may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an
attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”41 Here, he is appropriating a
32. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52 (opinion of the Court).
33. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
34. See id. at 241.
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36. For analysis of Lochner along these lines, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 45–51 (1993). Sunstein’s analysis of Plessy suggests this analogy between the
two cases. See id. at 42–45, 56, 64–67.
37. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
38. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
39. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225–26, 228–29.
40. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
41. Id. at 241.
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version of the anti-caste principle to condemn affirmative action programs. He
adds that such programs stoke the resentment of non-African Americans.42 We
should observe that Thomas, despite his criticism of Brown for emphasizing
“feelings” or “sensitivity,” is here emphasizing both the feelings of inferiority
of African Americans and the feelings of resentment of non-African
Americans.
In Parents Involved, Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts take a new tack
regarding Brown. It’s one thing to say that the Constitution is color-blind—
that’s what Thomas has been saying up to now. It’s quite another thing to say
that Brown says the Constitution is color-blind—yet Chief Justice Roberts’s
plurality opinion in Parents Involved insinuates precisely that: “It was not the
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the
basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in
1954.”43 Similarly, Thomas now rewrites Brown, implying that it did reflect
the color-blind principle as against the anti-caste principle. He asserts that his
view of the color-blind Constitution “was the rallying cry for the lawyers who
litigated Brown,”44 even relating an anecdote about Thurgood Marshall, during
his most depressed moments, turning to his “Bible,” Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy.45 But there can be no doubt that Marshall himself held the anti-caste
conception and viewed Harlan’s dissent as expressing the anti-caste
conception.46
Thomas also asserts that Breyer’s dissent, though ostensibly invoking an
anti-caste conception of equal protection,47 “replicates” the arguments made by
“[t]he segregationists in Brown . . . to a distressing extent,” and that “Brown
decisively rejected those arguments.”48 What is more, Thomas now resurrects
Plessy, tarring Justice Breyer’s dissent with its brush. Thomas asserts that
Breyer’s view—”pin[ning] its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to
current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely
practical consequences, and reliance on previous statements from this and
other courts”—“first appeared in Plessy, where the Court asked whether a state
law providing for segregated railway cars was ‘a reasonable regulation.’”49
In fact, though, Thomas himself resurrects Plessy’s view of the world in
his concurrence in Parents Involved. One, he denies that in the field of

42. Id.
43. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2767 (2007).
44. Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2783.
46. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 392–93 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
47. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896)).
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education, separate is inherently unequal.
Where Breyer sees racial
segregation,50 Thomas sees only “[r]acial imbalance,” and claims that “[r]acial
imbalance is not segregation.”51 Thomas states that “racial imbalance can also
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary
housing choices.”52 He surely would view these voluntary housing choices
about where to live as a product of freedom of association (remember Herbert
Wechsler’s critique of Brown53).
Furthermore, Thomas disputes Breyer’s argument that integration
improves educational outcomes for black children, stating: “In reality, it is far
from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much
less that integration is necessary to black achievement.”54 Thomas here is
unwittingly paraphrasing Plessy’s infamous passage:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the
assumption that the . . . separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found
in the [separation], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
55
construction upon it.

For, on Thomas’s view, many African Americans attending predominantly
black schools have succumbed to feelings of inferiority, victimhood, and
entitlement.56 That is because they—aided and abetted by proponents of
integration and affirmative action—have mistakenly chosen to put that
construction upon it. They should instead, according to Thomas, take pride in
the accomplishments of the students from these predominantly black schools.57
And, they should work hard and succeed rather than whining about being a
victim of racism. Furthermore, on Thomas’s view, Justice Breyer and white
progressives are engaging in “[r]acial paternalism” and insult by assuming that
the predominantly black schools are inferior.58 Indeed, Thomas views them as
patronizing and demeaning to blacks who have succeeded in such schools.
This sounds a lot like a “de facto” version of “separate but equal” for our
time.59

50. Id. at 2801–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring).
52. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769.
53. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 34 (1959).
54. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
56. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2775–79 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the
achievement of black students in predominantly black schools).
57. Id. at 2777–78.
58. Id. at 2775.
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Two, Thomas disputes Breyer’s argument that integration in education
benefits democracy, either by reflecting the “pluralistic society in which our
children will live” or by “teaching children to engage in the kind of
cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of
three hundred million people one Nation.”60 Thomas writes: “[I]t is unclear
whether increased interracial contact improves racial attitudes and relations.”61
In Thomas’s words, I hear echoes of Plessy:
We cannot accept this proposition . . . that social prejudices may be overcome
by [governmental action]. . . . If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of
62
each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.

It seems to me that, ironically, Thomas is not only rewriting Brown and
resurrecting Plessy, but perhaps even rewriting Brown as resurrecting Plessy!
For hereafter, Brown is to be interpreted through a worldview analogous to that
of Plessy.
III. WHAT COOPER SAID—AND SHOULD HAVE SAID—COULD EDWIN MEESE
BE RIGHT THIS TIME?
In an event whose occasion is the 50th anniversary of Cooper v. Aaron,
and whose keynote speaker is David Strauss, our leading theorist of common
law constitutional interpretation, I would be remiss if I did not say something
about Cooper in relation to common law constitutional interpretation. Cooper
proclaims that the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of
the United States Constitution for the federal system: “the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”63 In recent years,
many discussions of Cooper have focused on this pronouncement, and what
Cooper entails for “judicial supremacy.”64
My focus will be different. We should distinguish between two
fundamental interrogatives of constitutional interpretation that are at issue in
Cooper:65 What is the Constitution? and Who may authoritatively interpret it?
When people talk about the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper in terms of
60. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
61. Id. at 2780–81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
63. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
64. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
65. For works that conceptualize the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the basis of
not only these two interrogatives but also a third—How ought we to interpret the Constitution?,
see JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
71–72 (2006); WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & STEPHEN
MACEDO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (4th ed. 2008).
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judicial supremacy, they are talking about Cooper’s answer to the “Who”
interrogative: the Court’s anointment of itself as the ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. Consider, for example, several other papers in this symposium.66
But I want to talk about Cooper’s answer to the “What” interrogative. In
Cooper, the Supreme Court practically equates the Constitution itself with
what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution. The reasoning proceeds
by syllogism. Major premise: “Article 6 of the Constitution makes the
Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’”67 Minor premise: Marbury
declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”68 Conclusion: “It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the
Brown Case is the supreme law of the land.”69 Put another way, the Court
practically obliterates the distinction between the Constitution itself and
constitutional law. In doing so, as former Attorney General Edwin Meese
famously objected, “the Court seemed to reduce the Constitution [, our
fundamental and paramount law,] to the status of ordinary constitutional law,
and to equate the judge with the lawgiver.”70
What turns on this distinction between the Constitution itself and
constitutional law? Nothing less than whether we can criticize the Supreme
Court’s decisions as erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. As Meese
puts it, “to confuse the Constitution with judicial pronouncements allows no
standard by which to criticize and seek the overruling of what University of
Chicago Law Professor Philip Kurland once called the ‘derelicts of
constitutional law’—cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson.”71 It
pains me to acknowledge that Meese might ever have been right about
anything, but I must say it: Meese was right this time.72 And let’s observe a
splendid irony: Meese is saying that the implication of Cooper, the case that
reaffirmed Brown, is that we cannot criticize Plessy as wrongly decided.
I want to generalize Meese’s criticism of Cooper and frame it as a
challenge to common law constitutional interpretation. For Cooper, in its
equation of the Constitution itself with constitutional law, may seem to be a

66. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and The Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1087 (2008); Frederic M. Bloom, Cooper’s Quiet Demise (A Short Response to Professor
Strauss), 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115 (2008); Kermit Roosevelt III, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial
Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents Involved, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1191 (2008), Anders
Walker, “Things Cannot Go On As They Are”: Contextualizing Herbert Weschler’s Critique of
The School Segregation Cases, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211 (2008).
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
69. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
70. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987 (1987).
71. Id. at 989.
72. Cf. Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987).
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canonical expression of common law constitutional interpretation. And
therefore, one of the challenges for common law constitutional interpretation is
to articulate a criterion for criticizing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
the Constitution on the ground that they have misinterpreted the Constitution.
To generalize, any adequate theory of constitutional interpretation needs a
criterion for distinguishing the Constitution itself from constitutional law.
Originalism in all of its varieties readily provides such a criterion: original
meaning of the Constitution may trump judicial doctrine of constitutional law
at any time.73 Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution,74 and
Sotirios A. Barber’s and my philosophic approach to constitutional
interpretation,75 also readily provide such a criterion: we can always criticize
judicial doctrine from the standpoint of the moral and political theory that
provides the best justification of the Constitution.
What about common law constitutional interpretation? Does it provide a
criterion for distinguishing the Constitution from constitutional law? Does it
provide a standpoint from which to criticize the “derelicts of constitutional
law” like Plessy? And from which to justify Brown? Indeed, from which to
criticize the work of the Roberts Court?
In pondering this question, we should distinguish several varieties of
common law constitutional interpretation: (1) ipse dixit common law
constitutional interpretation; (2) doctrinalist common law constitutional
interpretation; (3) Strauss’s “rational traditionalist” common law constitutional
interpretation; and (4) moral reading common law constitutional interpretation.
I’ll sketch each as I go along.
Needless to say, an ipse dixit common law constitutionalism could justify
Brown in a manner of speaking: it would simply say, the Constitution equals
what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution, and since the Supreme
Court itself decided Brown, the decision is justified ipse dixit. That would
hardly be a satisfactory account.
What do I mean by doctrinalist common law constitutional interpretation?
This would be the view that one can avoid making moral and philosophic
arguments and judgments in constitutional interpretation if we simply develop
and apply doctrine, deciding one case at a time through the common law
method. Perhaps Herbert Wechsler was in the grip of such a conception.
Perhaps that is one reason why he thought Brown was not justifiable, and why

73. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
LAW 38–47 (1997); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against
Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007).
74. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996).
75. See, e.g., BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 13, at xiii–xiv, 155–70.
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it violated the commitment to neutral principles.76 In fact, far from being weak
on principle, Brown’s strong suit is principle, its commitment to an anti-caste
principle of equal citizenship. Strauss has put this very well in his lecture.77 In
any case, Barber and I have criticized a doctrinalist common law approach in
our new book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions.78 We have
shown that it cannot avoid the moral and philosophic choices that it aims and
claims to avoid.
Also, needless to say, a theory of common law constitutional interpretation
that incorporates the moral reading of the Constitution could justify Brown; it
would say that the anti-caste principle of equal citizenship manifested in
Brown is the best interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, and that
Plessy’s view that “separate but equal” does not deny equal protection is
mistaken.79
Now, Strauss presumably would say that a “rational traditionalist” theory
of common law constitutional interpretation like his own80 also can criticize
Plessy and justify Brown, but it is a little harder to articulate why. He certainly
allows moral insights and judgments into common law constitutional
interpretation,81 but it is less clear how he can do so (and how he does so) than
it is, say, with Dworkin’s moral reading or Barber’s and my philosophic
approach. And so, we should ask whether a moral reading is really doing the
work here in criticizing Plessy and justifying Brown, not a version of common
law constitutional interpretation that is an alternative to the moral reading. I
propose this as a friendly amendment to Strauss’s theory of common law
constitutional interpretation.
CONCLUSION
I want to thank David Strauss for his wise and profound remarks about
Cooper and the legacy of Brown, in particular about how conservatives are
radically recasting the meaning and legacy of Brown. We must step up our
efforts in this vein, lest the conservatives of the Roberts Court ironically
rewrite Brown as resurrecting Plessy! That would be both a travesty and a
tragedy.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Wechsler, supra note 53, at 27, 34.
Strauss, Little Rock, supra note 3, at 8–9.
BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 13, at 135–40.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 379–92 (1986).
See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 7, at 891.
Id. at 894–97.

